We propose a model of maturity rationing. When there is asymmetric information about default probabilities, firms may be unable to obtain financing for long-term projects. This is because asymmetric information worsens with the maturity of the project, such that lending markets for long maturities can break down (maturity rationing). Worse, firms whose first-best projects cannot get financed may react by adopting second-best projects of shorter maturities. This worsens the pool of financed projects, further amplifying rationing: a rationing spiral can emerge. Maturity rationing is stronger during recessions and, through its knock-on effects, may amplify the business cycle.
Introduction
The recent financial crisis has underscored the importance of financial market frictions for real activity. In particular, frictions in financial markets may propagate and ampflify shocks to the economy, and thus may magnify the amplitude and increase the persistence of the business cycles. One important phenomenon in the past crisis, and over the business cycle in general, has been the shortening of debt maturities, as documented for example by Mian and Santos (2011) . In this paper, we propose a model of the causes and consequences of such maturity shortening. More specifically, we propose a simple model of maturity rationing, which can be seen as the generalization of credit rationing (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; DeMeza and Webb, 1987) to the maturity structure: In our model, asymmetric information frictions lead to credit rationing for longer maturities, while financing may be available for shorter maturity projects. Starting from this insight, our paper thus generates a theory of maximum equilibrium debt maturity and the real investment distortions that follow, such as the amount and composition of real investment undertaken by firms..
The main idea behind our model is that, under fairly general conditions, frictions stemming from asymmetric information are more severe at longer horizons compared to shorter horizons. As a result, beyond a certain maturity asymmetric information is too severe for financing to be sustained in equilibrium; credit is rationed beyond that point. More specifically, in our model there is asymmetric information about the riskiness and default probabilities of firms. Some firms have "good" projects which are risk-free and have positive NPV, whereas other firms have "bad" projects which are risky, as they can default over time, and have negative NPV. Firms seek debt financing from a financial sector that cannot observe the type of the firms' projects. Since bad firms can always mimic good firms, the only way for firms to attract funding is through pooling contracts. Hence, in order for the financier to break even, the interest rate on the pooling debt contract has to increase with maturity in order to reflect higher default risk at long horizons. However, beyond a certain point this increase in interest rates causes firms with good projects not to seek financing.
Good firms drop out of the market and, with only bad firms left to seek financing, lending breaks down beyond a certain maturity -maturity rationing.
After establishing our baseline model, we then show that maturity rationing can lead to important knock-on effects. In particular, to escape rationing, firms whose first-best projects cannot get financed may react by adopting second-best projects of shorter maturities, for which financing is available. In fact, even firms with longer maturity projects that can attract funding may prefer to adopt second-best projects with shorter maturities, because the adverse selection discount is smaller at shorter maturities. However, the resulting inflow of secondbest projects worsens the pool of funded projects. This leads to a negative externality that exacerbates rationing by further shortening the maximum maturity that can be funded and worsening the financing terms for firms that can receive funding. But as financing terms worsen and more firms are rationed, this again leads to an additional inflow of second-best projects into the funded region. The process repeats and a rationing spiral emerges. When the negative externality from the adoption of second-best project in response to rationing is strong enough, it can lead to a complete breakdown of financing across all maturities. This is illustraded in Figure 1 .
In general, the adoption of shorter maturity projects by rationed firms can increase or decrease surplus, depending on the severity of the externality. At one extreme, when second- best projects are (almost) as good as first-best projects, the privately optimal decision of rationed firms to seek shorter maturity projects increases surplus. In this case, rationed firms that adopt shorter maturity projects in order to obtain financing do not impose an externality on financed firms, and thus the only consequence from the firms' maturity adjustement is an increase in output as lower maturities unambiguously in this case lead to less severe adverse selection. On the other hand, when second-best projects are worse than firm's initial, firstbest projects, the dilution of the financed pool by firms who change their maturity can lead to a decrease in surplus. While it is privately optimal for each individual firm to adopt a second-best shorter maturity project, the dilution externality on the pool leads to an overall reduction in surplus.
Our theory generates a number of empirical predictions. First, the model predicts a link between maturity rationing and the business cycle. In particular, a decrease in the fraction of good projects or an increase in the relative default probability of bad projects execarbates maturity rationing and thus reduces investment. This suggests that maturity rationing is stronger during recessions. Mian and Santos (2011) document such shortening of debt maturity (relative to its long-term trend) during downturns. This worsening of maturity rationing during downturns, and the related knock-on effects, may amplify the business cycle. Second, through firms' endogenous adjustment to maturity rationing, our model predicts short-termism as a result of asymmetric information frictions. Particularly during downturns unattractive funding terms at longer horizons may force firms to adopt inferior investment projects of shorter maturity.
Our paper relates to and extends the extensive literature on credit rationing. For a summary of this literature, a good starting point is the discussion in Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, Chapter 2) or the survey on financial contracting by Harris and Raviv (1992) . The classic contributions on credit rationing are Jaffee and Modigliani (1969) , Jaffee and Russell (1976) , Bester (1985) , Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and DeMeza and Webb (1987) . Suarez and Sussman (1997) develop an overlapping generations model in which credit rationing can lead to endogenous business cycles. Kurlat (2010) builds an investment model in which firms sell projects that are subject to adverse selection and shows that the resulting friction responds to aggregate shocks, thus amplifying the repsonse of prices and investment.
The main innovation of our paper relative to this literature is to extend the concept of credit rationing to a framework in which firms have investment projects of differing maturities. This additional element allows us to investigate the link between credit rationing and the maturity of a firm's investment and financing. In addition, the model allows us to analyze investment distortions and endogenous short-termism that arise from asymmetric information frictions and rationing of longer maturities. This endogenous adjustment pushes firms to shorter maturities, but unlike the papers by Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991) , shortening of maturity is not an attempt by a good firm to signal its type. Rather, maturity shortening stems from a firm's desire to pool with other firms at maturities where asymmetric information frictions are less severe.
Maturity Rationing: Baseline Model
In this section we develop our baseline model of maturity rationing. Consider a competitive, risk-neutral financial sector that provides debt financing to firms that borrow funds in order undertake investment projects. There is a continuum of such firms, and each firm is born with an investment project of a particular maturity. The maturity of a project, which is drawn uniformly from the interval [0, T ], indicates how long it takes for the project to pay off. A project of maturity t ∈ [0, T ] generates cash flow only at date t and no cash flows beforehand. Project maturity is observable to both firms and financiers, such that there is no asymmetric information about when a particular project pays off. The financial sector posts a funding schedule that details the applicable interest rate (or face value) for a project of maturity t.
While there is symmetric information about project maturity, there is asymmetric information about the quality of projects. Some firms, which we will refer to as "good firms", have positive NPV projects ("good" projects), while "bad firms" have negative NPV (or "bad") projects. Whether a project is good or bad is only observable to the firm (or the entrepreneur-we will use those terms interchangeably), but not to the financier. All the financier knows is that a fraction β of firms have good projects, while a fraction 1 − β of firms have bad projects.
Both good and bad projects cost 1 dollar to set up, but they differ in the payoffs they generate. Good projects are risk-free and pay off a certain amount e rt R at maturity t, where r denotes the constant, exogenous risk-free rate. The present value of the cash flows from a good project is thus given by R and is independent of project maturity. We assume that good projects have constant positive NPV:
Bad projects, on the other hand, are riskier than good projects and have a constant negative NPV. In particular, we assume that once off the ground, the payoffs from a bad project are a mean-preserving spread of a freaction ∆ of the payoffs from a good project: bad projects default with intensity λ, but when they are successful they pay off e (λ+r)t R. We interpret
as the probability that bad projects 'get off the ground', so that with probability 1 − ∆ they are worthless from the start. The reader should think of ∆ as the part of default risk that is independent of the maturity of the project. Together, these assumptions imply that bad projects have a constant negative of NPV of
Finally, in line with Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) , we assume that in the case of default, the 1 Most of our results are robust to variations in these assumptions. For example, it is not necessary to assume that the drift of bad projects compensates for the default intensity λ. However, this assumption is convenient because it guarantees that the NPV of bad projects is independent of the project maturity. Hence, our results are driven by differences in asymmetric information frictions across different maturities as opposed to differences in NPV across different maturities.
entrepreneur incurs a private cost. We assume that this cost is proportional to the return generated in the default state, which would occur naturally, for example, if the entrepreneur holds a small equity stake in the project. This assumption is a equivalent of the cost of the loss of collateral in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) , which also affects good and bad types differentially.
The cash flows that are realized at maturity are private information to the firm and are not contractible, in the spirit of Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and Hart and Moore (1994) . Specifically, we assume that at maturity it can only be verified whether or not a project succeeded, but that the exact cash flow that the project generated cannot be verified.
Hence, a successful bad firm that receives e (λ+r)t R at maturity can always pretend that it has only received e rt R, and pocket the difference.
From the point of the financier, firms with bad projects are contractually indistinguishable from firms with good projects. This is because bad firms can always mimic good firms, such that financiers cannot screen out either type. This means that financing is possible whenever the financier can break even on a financing contract that pools good and bad firms for a given maturity t. Financiers have to break even for every given maturity since competition makes it impossible to cross-subsidize across maturities.
Given our assumption on the verifiability of cash flows above, the optimal financial contract that pools good an bad types takes the from of a debt contract. This debt contract can be a long-term debt contract that matches debt maturity with project maturity, but it could also take the form of a sequence of shorter-term rollover contracts. In addition, the financier cannot set the face value of the debt contract,D (t), higher than e rt R. If the face value of debt exceeded e rt R, good firms would default with probability one, and, because default is costly to entrepreneurs, they would not participate. Hence, the debt contract would only attract bad firms. The maximum face value that supports pooling at any particular maturity t is thus given by given byD max (t) = e rt R.
2
Whether projects of maturity t can receive financing thus depends on whether the face value of debt that the financier requires to break even lies below the maximum face value that attracts both good and bad firms. Given a pool quality of β, the investor breaks even by setting the face value of debt toD such that
Defining the present value of the face value of debt as D ≡ e −rtD , we can rewrite this breakeven constraint as
Note that the breakeven face value is increasing in time to maturity. This reflects that the riskiness of bad projects increases with their horizon (even though their NPV remains fixed).
The maximum funded maturity M is then given by the maximum maturity for which the breakeven debt contract still attracts both good and bad firms, i.e., characterized bỹ
When this maximum maturity lies below the maximum maturity T , some maturities cannot attract funding, such that there is maturity rationing.
2 Note that because we set the low cash flow to zero, this contract could also be structured as an equity contract. However, if the payoff in the low state was L > 0, then a debt contract becomes strictly optimal, since to loosen the incentive constraint in the high state it is always optimal to extract as much as possible in the low state. This is illustrated in Figure 2 .
Proposition 1 The maximum project maturity that can attract financing is given by
There is maturity rationing whenever M (β) < T . Firms that receive funding are indifferent between a long-term debt contract that matches maturities and any sequence of rollover debt contracts that allow the financier to break even.
By competition, the lending sector will never ration at a lower maturity than M (β), as each non funded maturity below M (β) is a profit opportunity.
Proposition 1 shows that asymmetric information may lead to credit market breakdown beyond certain maturities. In particular, whenever M (β) < T , projects with maturities on the interval (M (β) , T ] cannot receive financing and are rationed. Maturity rationing thus arises whenever the proportion of good firms lies below a critical quality level β. Using M β = T we find that this cutoff is given by
Note that lim T →∞ β = 1 R ≡ β. Thus, when the pool of firms is of high enough pool quality, any maturity can attract financing. On the other hand, when β is sufficiently low, financing can break down across all maturities, leading to extreme maturity rationing.
Solving M β = 0, we find that this is the case whenever
When β lies in between β and β there is partial rationing. Projects of maturity t ≤ M (β)
can be financed, whereas projects whose maturity exceeds M (β) cannot attract financing and are rationed. Similar to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) , this rationing arises because of the additional risk of bad projects at long horizons. This additional risk forces the financier to raise the face value of debt, but at some point this causes good firms to drop out of the market, which leads to the market breakdown beyond M (β).
Proposition 1 generates a number of comparative statics. First, we see that the funded interval is increasing in the proportion of good projects β. Second, the funded interval is decreasing in the default intensity of bad projects λ. Both of these comparative statics suggest a link of maturity rationing to the business cycle. In particular, if during downturns either the proportion of positive NPV project drops, or if downturns are associated with and increase in asymmetric information about firms' default risk, our model predicts that the maximum funded maturity decreases during recessions. In addition, the funded interval is increasing the the NPV of the good project R and the NPV of the bad project ∆R.
3
By looking at the total surplus that is generated in equilibrium, we can also use Proposition 1 to examine the welfare implications of the model. When β ≥ β, all maturitites 0 to T are funded. This outcome is thus akin to the result on DeMeza and Webb (1987) :
asymmetric information leads to overinvestment because both good and bad projects are funded, while in a first-best equilibrium only good projects would be financed. Hence, even when β ≥ β , welfare is less than first-best because negative NPV projects are funded.
Once β drops below β, we move from a fully funded equilibrium to a rationing equilibrium in which not all maturities can attract financing. This leads to an unambiguous welfare loss relative to the fully funded case: as long as the expected NPV, βN P V G + (1 − β) N P V B , is positive, any rationing reduces welfare. To formalize this, denote the mass of firms on the
financing, such that overall surplus drops to
Finally, it is instructive to examine the expected profits of good and bad firms. Because investors break even in expectation, on average firms receive the entire NPV from their 3 Explicit calculations for these comparative statics are in the Appendix.
investment projects. Hence, the unconditional expected profit for a funded firm with project maturity t is given by
However, while the average firm just earns its NPV, this is not true conditional on firm type. This is the case because in the presence of asymmetric information good firms subsidize bad firms. The expected discounted profit for a good firm with a project of maturity t given pool quality β is given by
This is less than the good firm's NPV, which is equal to R − 1. Moreover, the profits of firms with good projects are decreasing in project maturity t because the face value of debt,
, is increasing in maturity. Essentially, because adverse selection is more severe at longer horizons, good firms with projects of long maturities are losing more surplus in the form of a cross-subsidy to bad firms. Note also that, for any maturity, π G is increasing in the quality of the pool of firms β because D (t, β) is decreasing in β. This is the case because cross-subsidization become less severe the better the average quality of the pool.
Turn now to the profit of a firm with a bad project. We know that since the total surplus at every maturity t is constant at βN P V G + (1 − β) N P V B , the expected discounted profit for a bad firm has to be increasing in t. Writing out the profit for a bad firm at maturity t we find that
which is strictly positive and increasing in t. The reason that the bad firm's profit increases in t is the increasing volatility of the bad project, which allows bad firms to capture more surplus at longer project maturities: the volatility raises the value of a bad firm's equity claim and more than compensates for the increase in face value. As with good firms, the profit for a bad firm π B is increasing in pool quality β because D (t, β) is decreasing in the pool quality β.
Finally, our assumptions on the project characteristics give us the following implications on variance.
Lemma 1 The good project's variance of its discounted cash flows is

V ar
and the bad project's variance of its discounted cash flows is
which is increasing in t. Additionally, the average variance of projects at maturity t is given by V ar
which is decreasing in β for ∆ ∈ 1 2 , 1 .
Lemma 1 etablishes that while the variance of the good project is constant at zero, the variance of the bad project is positive and increasing with maturity. In addition, as long
, 1 , the average volatility of firms for any maturity t ≥ 0 is decreasing with pool quality β.
Second-best Projects, Dilution and Knock-on Effects
In this setion we extend our baseline model to allow firms to adjust their investment decision in response to the asymmetric information friction. More specifically, we assume that, while firms are born with a first-best project with some maturity drawn uniformly from Ω = 0, T , they can adjust their project maturity in response to asymmetric information frictions.
However, this adjustment in maturity comes at a cost to the firm: when a firm changes the maturity of its first-best investment opportunity, this reduces the attractiveness of the investment, such that the resulting project is only second-best. This assumption captures the intution that it is costly for firms to distort their investments away from the first-best investment strategy given to them by nature.
To make the analysis tractable, we make the following assumptions: After a firm learns the maturity of its first-best project, but before the quality of the project is revealed to the firm, firms can decide to search for a new project with a different and potentially shorter maturity. To search for a new project, firms effectively play a bandit: If a firm decides to redraw its project in order to change its project maturity, the firm receives a new project drawn from the original maturity distribution (i.e., uniform on [0, T ]). Moreover, when playing the bandit, the firm loses access to its original project.
Drawing a new project has no direct cost for firms (i.e., the firm can play the bandit for free). However, changing project maturity comes at an indirect cost because, as mentioned above, the average quality of newly obtained projects is lower. Specifically, we assume that the probability of a newly obtained project being of high quality drops from β to αβ , where
In this sense, we refer to these projects as second best.
On the credit supply side, we assume that financiers compete by posting schedules of financing terms. Specifically, financiers are competitive and simultaneously post schedules of face values for every financed maturity. After the schedules of financing terms have been posted, entrepreneurs fund themselves at the best rate they can find if funding is available for the maturity of their investment project.
The introduction of investment distortions in response to asymmetric information gives rise to two feedback mechanisms. The first is a direct externality: firms that adopt secondbest projects in response to asymmetric information frictions dilute the pool of funded projects. As this pool is diluted, debt becomes more expensive for the firms originally located in the funded region, possibly changing their decision between staying at their original maturity or searching for a new, second-best projects. Second, because of adverse selection at any maturity the face value of debt can rise up to a certain point before good firms decide not to seek financing. Hence, at some point the inflow of second-best projects that results from firms' redrawing their maturities means that investors will stop financing maturities that were funded before. As we will see, this second effect can potentially lead to rapid changes in equilibrium funding for small changes in parameters, up to complete unraveling of funding at all maturities.
Once we allow firms to redraw the maturity of their projects, an equlibrium is given by a a set of project redrawal decisions by firms and offered funding terms by financier that meet the following conditions:
Definition 1 An equilibrium is given by redrawing decisions by firms and funding conditions
offered by the financier sector such that:
Given the funding terms offered, no funded firms have an incentive to redraw the maturity of their projects (an incentive compatability (IC) constraint).
Investors break even at each funded maturity (an individual rationality (IR) constraint).
In the next subsection we discuss existence and uniqueness of equilibrium and characterize the properties of the equilibrium that arises when firms can adjust their investment decisions in response to asymmetric information. After characterizing the equilibrium, we then first consider the two extreme cases, (i) α = 1 (no dilution from second-best project) and (ii) α = 0 (maximum dilution from second-best projects). These two cases are useful to build intuition about the knock-on effects of maturity rationing when firms can adjust their real investment decisions in reponse to adverse selection frictions. After covering the two extreme cases, we treat the general case α ∈ (0, 1).
Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in cutoff strategies
This section shows that there is a unique equilibrium in cutoff strategies, in which financiers fund maturities from 0 up to some cutoff T .
Before we derive the equilibrium, let us first introduce some important concepts we will use repeatedly. First, we define the set of cutoff strategies T that can be funded. For this,
we denote by x (T ) the average pool quality on [0, T ] under the assumption that firms on T, T redraw their maturities. If everyone on T, T redraws, the average pool quality x (T )
whereas the average pool quality on T, T is simply given byx = αβ < x (T ) (the only firms in this interval are ones who after searching for a second-best project ended up on T, T ).
4
What are the incentives for entrepreneurs to change their maturities? Clearly, an unfunded firm always has an incentive to draw a new project, since redrawing is costless and hence a free option. We will thus concentrate on the incentives of funded firms to redraw their maturities. First, given any set of firms that redraw their maturities R, the quality on Ω/R is x (R) (with some slight abuse of notation), and the quality on R is αβ. We show below that among the entrepreneurs who have not redrawn their maturity, the entrepreneur with the highest maturity, i.e. sup Ω/R, has the largest incentive to redraw his project maturity. Let us further define the term "funded properly" to mean funded at an average quality x > αβ in contrast to funding at the worst possible pool quality αβ, which can be 4 The derivative of pool quality is Proof. To see this, first note that the payoff from drawing a new project is independent of current maturity t. Thus, we only have to concentrate on the payoff from staying put.
Consider a firm with a project of maturity t under the conjecture that all firms on R decide to redraw. What is the firm's tradeoff between redrawing or keeping its original maturity?
Using x = x (R), the payoff from staying and its maturity derivative are given by
where we used the fact that
This immediately implies that incentives to keep the original project are larger for firms with projects of shorter maturity.
The main mechanism behind this results is that adverse selection increases with project maturity t. An entrepreneur of quality β will have to pay a rate in excess of the applicable fair rate (as it is calculated on the basis of x (R) < β) at any t. However, this gap between the actual rate and the fair rate increases with t, so that the benefits of staying put decreases.
5
When changing maturity, with a certain probability, the entrepreneur will draw a maturity that is less than max [T, M (αβ)] and thus receive funding under the conjecture that [0, T ] is funded. We can thus write out the payoff to redrawing maturity as:
Let us define the net value of redrawing as the difference between the payoffs from redrawing and staying put,
summarizes the IC constraint of the entrepreneurs, while only partially taking the IR constraint of the financiers into account -the equilibrium pricing relation D (t, x) is taken into account, but not the adverse selection constraint D (t, x) ≤ R. As entrepreneurs are infinitesimal, they do not take the impact of their redrawing decisions into account.
Second, let us now look at the additional adverse selection dimension of the problem:
the possibility that the price mechanism is not flexible enough to accomodate the change in pool quality at a given maturity. To this end, we define the set of cutoff strategies T that are funded under the conjecture that everyone on T, T decides to draw a new project as
5 Note that the payoff from staying is less than [β + (1 − β) ∆] R − 1 because β > x (T ) so that
Unfunded Cutoffs Funded Cutoffs Funded Cutoffs Funded set The funded set F. The funded set indicates whether a given maturity cutoff can be financed, given that all firms beyond that cutoff redraw their maturity. For example, in the graph 4 ∈ F, this means that zero to four years can be an equilibrium funding interval. The same is true for the interval zero to nine years , as 9 ∈ F. However, note that 6 / ∈ F, which means that zero to six years cannot be an equilibrium funding interval.
T ∈ F means that a conjectured cutoff T implies a pool quality x (T ) that leads to a maximum funded maturity M (x (T )) that is weakly larger than this cutoff. The set F is thus determined by the investors' break-even condition and summarizes the financiers IR constraint completely, while ignoring the entrepreneurs IC constraint -the implicit assumption in the definition of F is that no one of the funded investors [0, T ] redraws.
The funded set F is illustrated in Figure 3 . The boundaries of the set F are fixed points defined by T = M (x (T )). Hence, F maps into a set of monotone sets, in that for each T ∈ F we know that [0, T ] can be funded in equilibrium. However, F itself need not be monotone and can have holes, as discussed in Section 3.3. 
Then the unique equilibrium cutoff is given by
when we restrict the analysis to cutoff equilibria.
Proof. When financiers compete by posting funding schedules, we make the following two observations that will guarantee uniqueness. First, we note that a lower cutoff T leads to there is an equilibrium with T < T * and T ∈ F ∩ E. By the definition of T * , we also know that by T < T * there has to exist a T with T < T ≤ T * and T ∈ F ∩ E. A single financier, by offering funding up to T , will capture the whole market [0, T ] as he is able to offer a lower face value than D (t, x (T )) and still make a (small) profit. This is because x (T ) > x (T ).
By assumption, we have N V R (0) < 0 < N V R T so that by continuity of N V R (T ) we know that it crosses from negative into positive territory at least once, so E is not empty.
Competition amongst financiers drives the equilibrium funding schedules to extend all the way to T * = max F ∩ E.
The parameter restrictions needed for the proof are simply derived by plugging in 0 and T as funding cutoffs:
where we note that x (0) = β 
> 0, which reduces the above condition
If T * coincides with one of the roots of E then we call the equilibrium IR or entrepreneur driven. If T * coincides with a subset edge in F, then we call the equilibrium IC or investor driven. For the rest of paper, if not explicitly mentioned otherwise, we assume that N V R (T ) only has one root on 0, T , which we denote by T IC .
No dilution -α = 1
First, let us analyze the case in which there is no dilution from firms' changing their maturities, which is the case second best projects are of the same quality as first best projects (α = 1). In this case, when firms redraw maturities, there is no dilution of the pool -irre-spective of how many entrepreneurs change their maturity, the pool quality stays constant at β. We thus conclude that the funding horizon M (β) stays constant as well, i.e., the funded set is always given by F = 0, min M (β) , T . Thus, the only effect from firms' changing their maturities is that the mass of firms at each t changes.
The expected payoff from changing maturity is given by
Thus, if M (β) ≥ T the firm is indifferent between redrawing and staying as the entrepreneur always receives the expected NPV of the project regardless of maturity. If, on the other hand, there is some rationing to start with, i.e., M (β) < T , no one in the funded area will want to change their maturities for fear of losing funding, since the probability of finding a new project in the funded range is strictly less than one, This leads to straightforward welfare implications for this special case. As some previously rationed firms will find projects in the funded maturity range, the redrawing of maturities leads to an unambiguous welfare improvement. To quantify this gain, it is easy to show that everyone on M (β) , T redraws, and thus a mass
of firms that didn't have funding before successfully finds financing with their second best projects, increasing surplus.
Proposition 3 If α = 1, there is an unambiguous welfare gain from redrawing. The maturities that are funded in equilibrium are simply 0, min M (β) , T . For M (β) < T , it is a
dominant strategy for unfunded firms to redraw, and also for funded firms to stay.
Maximal dilution -α = 0
Consider now the case in which second best projects are always of the bad type, that is α = 0. In this case we will be able to prove results simply based on the funded set F and thus can sidestep the possible messy analysis of the set in which firms do not redraw their maturities, E.
Let us first consider M (β) < T , i.e., even before potential redrawing of maturities some firms are rationed out of the market. The average pool quality x (T ) with α = 0 then becomes
We can now establish that the externality of firms that adopt second-best projects can be sufficiently strong to unravel funding at all maturities irrespective of the entrepreneur cutoff T IC , i.e. the set of fundable cutoffs F is empty.
Proposition 4 The set of fundable cutoffs F is empty for β < 2β and M (β) < T . Funding completely unravels because rationed firms adopt second-best projects.
Second, let us consider the case where β ≥ β so that M (β) > T . We will now derive a sufficient condition for a no-redrawing equilibrium to exist. Let us start by conjecturing that everyone decides not to redraw. In this case, is there an individual incentive for any entrepreneur to redraw? We know from above that the entrepreneur's incentives are summarized by N V R T . If N V R T < 0, then indeed we have a no-redrawing equilibrium.
If however, we have N V R T > 0, we have some redrawing at T , and combining it with the result in the preceding proposition we know that then if the set F is empty after this cycle of redrawings is over, such that financing becomes impossible across all maturities.
Intermediate dilution -α ∈ (0, 1)
Let us now look at the general case where α ∈ (0, 1). We can characterize the funded set F via the following Lemma:
so that the function defining F, M (x (T )), is increasing and convex in T . If β > 2 1+α
β then 0 ∈ F, so that
there is at most one hole).
If β < 2 1+α
β then 0 / ∈ F, so that
if M (β) < T we have F = ∅ (i.e. complete unraveling), and 2. if M (β) > T we have that
, 2 1+α β and M (β) < T . Then we know that the funded set is emptyfunding is just possible up to M (β) without redrawing, which implies that T = M (x (T )) has a unique solution greater than T . As was the case with α = 0, there is complete unraveling of all funding solely due to redrawing. β,
1+R 2R
so we know that the funded set F includes some interval that starts at 0. A sufficient condition for the funded set F to be equal to 0, T is that M (x (0)) x (0) > 1 and that M (β) > T . It is also intuitive that if M (β) < T that the interval M (β) , T / ∈ F -if a project is not funded in the absence of redrawing, then surely an inferior second best project of the same maturity will not be funded either.
Output / Welfare
We are now in a position the discuss the output (or welfare -both terms will be used interchangeably) effects that result from firms' adjusting their maturities in response to adverse selection frictions. The two extreme case α = 1 and α = 0 demonstrated that there are two counteracting forces to consider. On one hand, as firms change their maturities, they shift project mass to lower maturities, which results in an inflow of new projects into the funded region. In isolation, as is the case for α = 1, this will lead to a welfare improvement.
On the other hand, as firms distort their investment policy, they dilute the pool in the funded region whenever their second-best projects have lower net present value. This effect was at work in isolation for α = 0: all additional firms that receive funding via maturity adjustment are negative NPV firms, thus reducing surplus. Even worse, the presence of these additional negative NPV firms will reduce the mass of good firms that can receive funding. This is because the dilution of pool quality leads to a shortening of the maximal funding horizon. Thus, the dilution will lead to welfare losses via a direct channel -individual firm 6 Note that β < 2 1+α β implies αβ < 2α 1+α β < β which in turn implies that M (αβ) = 0.
quality drops -and via an indirect channel -pool quality drops that leads to less firms being funded.
For intermediate values of α, these two effects will both be present and thus have to be traded off against each other. The overall welfare effect of maturity adjustment is thus a combination of the welfare gains from a possible increase in the mass of funded firms and the welfare losses from funding worse projects and restricting funding to good projects at some maturities.
To compare overall welfare before and after redrawing, let us first establish the mass of 
. After everyone on T, T redraws, this mass is given by
This means that we can decompose the welfare after redrawing, W s (α, β) into its separate effects: Thus, there is an unambiguous welfare gain. For α = 0, on the other hand, we know from the above arguments that there is either a total welfare loss or at least a partial oneeach project that arises out of redrawing is negative NPV, and some good projects will be squeezed out of the market by the investor's zero profit condition. While the two extreme cases show that the welfare difference relative to the static case can go either way, we can derive the following sufficient condition under which firms' privately optimal response to maturity rationing leads to additional welfare losses:
Proposition 5 A sufficient condition for an equilibrium with redrawing to lead to a welfare loss relative to the static case is that T < T 0 where T 0 is given by
T 0 > M (αβ) only holds iff α and β are such that
Proposition 5 states that there is an unambigous output loss if less people are funded after redrawing than in the static equilibrium, i.e. whenever Add.
0. This is inuitive: When after maturity adjustments fewer firms are financed overall, and if the average quality of those firms is lower than before firms adjust their maturities, a fortiori surplus must decrease. We will use the interpretation of total funded quantity as total lending for the remainder of the paper.
Implications
We will now numerically investigate the properties of the equilibrium when we allow firms to change their investment behavior in response to adverse selection. As we will see, the endogenous response of firms to the adverse selection can create additional amplification relative to the analysis in our baseline model.
Recall that by assumption there is a unique equilibrium if the net value to redrawing, i.e. N V R (T ), cuts 0 uniquely from below at T IC . Hence the equilibrium maximum funded maturity is given by
The maximum funded maturity T * has interesting dynamics. In particular, because of the endogenous adjustment of firms' investment decisions to adverse selection, the maximum funded maturity displays "falling of the cliff" dynamics: a small change in fundamentals can lead to a large change in funded maturities. This is caused by the a switch from a binding entrepreneur driven IC constraint to a binding financier driven IR constraint. of maturities. This line shows that already absent knock-on effects from the distortion of firms investment decisions, a deterioration in the average quality β leads to a non-linear decrease in the maximum funded maturity. Now consider, in addition, the effects resulting from fims' privately optimal decision to change their maturities. To do this, for simplicity we consider the case in which α = .7, which means that original projects have an average quality of β, whereas second-best projects have a qualtiy of .7 × β < β. The red line shows T IC , the cutoff that results from firms' privately optimal redrawing behavior. Firms located at maturities beyond T IC would decide to change their project maturity, even if funded. We find that in equilibrium no firm outside of this cutoff is funded (i.e. T * > M (αβ) for all β we consider). However, to determine whether a candidate redrawing cutoff T IC is actually funded by investors, we need to check whether it is part of the funded set, i.e., T IC ∈ F.
The blue line in Figure 5 illustrates the equilibrium T * . If this line does not coincide with the red line T IC , then the funding cutoff imposed by the investors is strictly tighter than the entrepreneur-driven cutoff T IC . In particular, the Figure illustrates that as the economy deteriorates and the average project quality β declines, the entrepreneur-driven maximum maturity T IC declines. For high β we see that T * = T IC . Over that region, a deterioration in β leads to a moderate decline in the maximum funded maturity. This effect is driven by the pure pecuniary externality as entrepreneurs that redraw impose higher average debt financing costs on entrerpeneurs that were already being funded and did not redraw. Entrepreneurs redraw in the hope of getting better funding terms, even if the absence of redrawing would result in funding for everyone, i.e., M (β) ≥ 10.
However, as β drops below .75 we see the second effect kick in. As more and more firms redraw, funding terms become sufficiently unattractive for firms with good projects. Since investors can no longer raise the face value of debt in order to break even, they start pulling the funding even from those entrepreneurs that were just indifferent between redrawing and staying. As these firms lose their funding, they search for shorter maturity projects by redrawing. Through this feedback loop the maximum funded maturity deteriorates. In the figure, this is the case when the red line lies above the blue line -although entrepreneurs are willing to stop redrawing their maturities at the red line, investors are unwilling to fund up to this threshold. This additional effect leads to a downward spiral all the way down to the blue line.
Figure 5 allows us to make two observations about the effects of firm's endogenous response to adverse selection. First, the maximum funded maturity when firms can change the maturity of their projects is lower than in the case in which they do not have this option.
Second, in comparison to the baseline case, the equilibrium in which firms can redraw their projects is fragile, in the sense that a switch from an entrepreneur-driven equilibrium to an investor-driven equilibrium can lead to 'falling off the cliff' dynamics.
Changes in initial project quality β. We now investigate the effect of changes in the initial pool quality β on total net ouput. Total output is the product the number of funded projects, i.e., quantity or total lending, and the average quality of the projects that are funded. As shown in Proposition 5, when the total quantity of funded projects declines, this results in an unambigious decline in ouptut because α ≤ 1. for our benchmark parameters. Output is broken down into its constitutents in the lower half of the graph: the bottom left panel depicts total funded quality, whereas the bottom right panel depicts total funded quantity, i.e., the total dollar amount lent. We see from the quantity graph that the ability to redraw on the side of the entrepreneurs leads to uniformly lower funding across the range of β's we consider. Furthermore, we see the dilution effect of redrawing on quality in the lower left panel, as quality is also uniformly lower. We see in all graphs the kink caused by the switch from the IC to the IR constraint as the binding constraint. Recall that Lemma 1 shows that individual ex-ante project variance increases as β declines. Thus, the drop in output occurs jointly with an increase in project variance as β declines. 
Changes in project volatility λ.
A purer measure of project volatility, without affecting the initial quality β, is the parameter λ which parameterizes the thickness of the tail of the bad project. This is illustrated in Figure 7 . As before, the top left panel analyses the funding cutoffs in response to changes in λ. We see that the funding cutoff falls off even dramatically as λ increases beyond 0.05. This sharp drop is caused by a switch from a relatively gently sloped IC constraint to an steeply sloped IR constraint. We also see that the IC constraint Changes in second-best project deterioration α. Finally, let us investigate the effect of changes in α, the degree to which second-best projects are inferior to first best projects. This is illustrated in Figure 8 . First, we see that in the top right panel, there is no falling off the cliff for our parameter choices because across the whole range of α the financier's IR constraint is binding. The top right panel highlights the intution we gained from Section 3.2 -when there is no or very little quality difference between first-and second-best projects (α close to 1), overall output increases when firms can redraw their project maturity. The bottom left panel shows that average quality declines quickly with α, clearly having a negative effect. However, this negative quality effect is outweighed, at least for high α > .88, by the increase in total lending, resulting in overall larger output. We also see that an increase in lending is not a sufficient statistic for an output expansion, as for α ∈ (.83, .88), output decreases compared to the benchmark model. This is because in this region the dilution of quality is strong enough to outweigh the expansion in overall funding.
Conclusion
This paper proposes a model of maturity rationing. We build on the credit rationing literature to illustrate how asymmetric information frictions lead to a theory of maximum funded maturities and the distortions that follow from it. In our model, firms may be unable to obtain financing for long-term projects because asymmetric information worsens with the maturity of the project. Beyond some maturity the lending market can break down (maturity rationing). Firms whose first-best projects cannot get financed may react by adopting second-best projects of shorter maturities. This generates enodgenous adverse selection in this model. Redrawing worsens the pool of financed projects, further amplifying rationing.
Hence, a rationing spiral emerges. Our model suggests that maturity rationing is stronger during recessions and, through its knock-on effects, may amplify the business cycle and cause more volatility on the project level. In addition, the model shows how asymmetric information frictions generate short-termism in investment decisions.
A Appendix
A.1 Comparative statics of D (t, β) and M (β)
The derivatives of D (t, β) are
The derivatives of M (β) are
A.2 Unobservable maturity
Suppose maturity is unobservable, so that the financiers offer a maturity un-contingent contract D (β) ≤ R.
The maximum value that financiers can possibly recoup per investment then is D = R which gives
We can now show that there is a unique T beyond which this expected return per project falls below the initial investment of 1. To this end, let us investigate the function
First, by L'Hopital we know that lim x→0 f (x) = 1 and lim x→0 f (x) = − 1 2 . Also, since 1 + x < e x for all x > 0 we have f (x) < 0 for all x ≥ 0. Further, note that lim x→∞ f (x) = 0. We thus know that
Thus, only if β > 1 R will there be funding without observable maturity in the limit. For any β < 1 R there is a unique finite T * (β) so that if the distribution extends beyond this value that the unobservable maturity market (without redrawing) completely collapses. However, for β < 1 R we note that there exists a finite T * such that the whole market breaks down. Funding, however, would still be available in the observable maturity case for low levels of t < M (β). The actual closed form solution for T * involves a Lambert-W function, and is given by
It is easy to check that T * (β) > M (β). We additionally have T * β = 0 and T * 1 R = ∞.
A.3 Rollover Contracts
In this section we show that the assumption that firms match maturities is without loss of generality. The reason is that when project maturity is observable, a firm that cannot raise financing by matching maturities can also not raise financing through a rollover debt contract. To see this, assume that some maturity T firm drawn out of a pool of quality β (not necessarily the static β) is rationed and that the longest available maturity is M (β) = t < T . We know show that a firm with a project of maturity T cannot finance via rollover if (i) project maturity is observed and (ii) the financier learns at rollover whether project has defaulted on [0, t] .
Proof: At the rollover date, the financier updates his belief on whether the financed firm is good or bad. Conditional on a firm having survived until the rollover date t, the probability that the firm is good is given by (A.7) and the probability that the firm is bad is (A.8) This implies that when rolling over its debt from t to T , the maximum a firm can credibly promise to repay is
where we used the fact that the maximum discounted face-value that a firm can credibly commit to is R. From 0 to t then the firm will be able to promise a maximal repayment of X if it stays alive until t, which gives the maximimum a firm can promise to repay at 0 as
We can rewrite this as A.15) But this is the same amount the firm can raise by financing directly up to date T. Hence, if maturity T is rationed, a firm with a project of maturity T can also not obtain financing by using rollover finance.
A.4 Benefit of redrawing
Note the following integral that we will evaluate numerous times. If an agent redraws onto [0, T ], he expects to repay on average the following discounted face value for x > αβ:
It is clear that for α = 0 and for α = 1 (and thus x = β) we have considerable simplifications. We can now write
A.5 Uniform as limit of truncated exponential
All of the results of the paper go through under a truncated exponential. A uniform distribution on 0, T is the limit of a truncated exponential distribution with intensity γ on 0, T as the intensity γ → 0. The pdf of a truncated exponential on 0, T is simply pdf γ,T (t) = 
A.6 Omitted proofs in the main text
Proof of Proposition 1. Writing outD (M, β) = e rM R, we have
from which the result easily follows. Proof of Lemma 1.
First, a good project has uniformly zero variance in its discounted cash flows as Return t = e rt R, that is V ar
On the other hand, the bad project will have a positive variance -it returns e (r+λ)t R with probability p = ∆e −λt and 0 with probability (1 − p) = 1 − ∆e −λt . Via the Bernoulli distribution variance formula V ar Bernoulli = p (1 − p) we have the variance of the discounted cash flows V ar
and we can see that V ar B t is increasing in t. Ex-ante, that is before the project is revealed to be good or bad, the variance can be easily determined via the variance decomposition V ar (X) = V ar (E [X|Y ]) + E [V ar (X|Y )] where we identify X with the outcome, i.e. Return t , and Y with the project being good with probability β and bad with probability (1 − β). Thus, the ex-ante variance for a project of maturity t is
V ar
ExAnte t The left hand side is always non-negative for t ≥ 0, and the right hand side is unambiguously non-positive for ∆ ∈ 1 2 , 1 -the quadratic expression 2∆ 2 − 3∆ + 1 has roots 1 2 and 1 and is increasing and positive as |∆| becomes large.
Proof of Proposition 3.
First, let us investigate if a conjectured cutoff T = 0 leaves any funding at t = 0. Noting that x (0) = as (1 − x) and (1 − xR) are both positive by assumption. Furthermore, we see that as x increases the denominator shrinks, and thus the derivative increases -the function M (x (T )) is convex in T . We conclude that in the case of β < 2β and T (β) < T the funded set F is empty. In other words, the market completely unravels. We know that αβ < x ≤ β, so any β ≤
Proof of Lemma
1+R
2R will lead to a positive second derivative M (x (T )) or convexity of the function M (x (T )) for all cutoffs T .
We can now state our first result for α ∈ (0, 1). The function M (x (T )) is increasing, it is convex if β < 1+R 2R and it is smaller than 0 at T = 0 if β < 2 1+α β. Suppose T is such that M (β) < T . Then we konw that the funded set is empty -funding is just possible up to M (β) without redrawing, which implies that T = M (x (T )) has a unique solution greater than T . Again, there is complete unraveling of all funding solely due to redrawing. we know that the funded set F includes some interval that starts at 0. As we know that M (x (T )) is convex and increasing, we know that F consists either of one interval [0, T 1 ] where T 1 ≤ T or two disjoint intervals [0, T 1 ] and T 2 , T with T 1 < T 2 < T . Two intervals or full funding can only exists in the case of M (β) > T , whereas one interval exists for the case of M (β) < T . A sufficient condition for the funded set F to be equal to 0, T is if M (x (0)) x (0) > 1 and that M (β) > T . It is also intuitive that if M (β) < T that the interval M (β) , T / ∈ F -if a project is not funded in the absence of redrawing, then surely an inferior second best project of the same maturity will not be funded either. 
